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RAWLS’ DIFFERENCE PRINCIPLE: 
ABSOLUTE vs. RELATIVE INEQUALITY 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
 In the book “A Theory of Justice”, John Rawls examines the notion of a just society.  
More specifically, he develops a conception of justice—Justice as Fairness—derived from his 
novel interpretation of the social contract.  Central to his account are two lexically-ordered 
principles of justice by which primary social institutions, or the basic structure of society, are 
ideally to be organized and regulated.  Broadly speaking, the second of Rawls’ two principles 
pertains to “the distribution of income and wealth”, and its formulation is to be understood as an 
expression of Rawls’ Difference Principle—roughly, the principle that “inequality in expectation 
is permissible only if lowering it would make the [worst-off] class even more worse off.”1 2 
I want to suggest that Rawls’ Difference Principle (DP) entails the following worrisome 
outcome: Because DP maximizes the absolute level of expectation (and disregards the relative 
level), it authorizes potentially immense levels of inequality, such that this inequality itself can 
become a source of social discord and injustice.  This paper will (§2) present Rawls’ formulation 
of DP, (§3) motivate the worrisome outcome entailed by DP, and (§4) offer a prima facie 
plausible solution in the form of an addendum to DP. 
 
2.  RAWLS’ DIFFERENCE PRINCIPLE 
An important motivation for developing the Difference Principle was to overcome what 
Rawls saw as a major shortcoming of classical Utilitarianism.  Rawls noted that “[a] striking 
                                                          
1 Rawls (1971), pg. 61. 
2 Ibid, pg. 78. 
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feature of the Utilitarian view of justice is that it does not matter, except indirectly, how [the] 
sum of satisfactions is distributed among individuals”.3  In other words, Utilitarianism is merely 
concerned with maximizing aggregate welfare for a society, and says nothing about the 
distribution of this welfare amongst individuals.  Rawls says that those in the original position—
the hypothetical rational agents charged with selecting principles of justice, while ignorant of any 
differentiating characteristics of themselves or others—would not opt for Utilitarianism, on the 
grounds that they would “rule out justifying institutions on the grounds that the hardships of 
some are offset by a greater good in the aggregate”.4  Instead, says Rawls, those in the original 
position (OP) would opt for something like the Difference Principle, which can be understood as 
follows: 
DP:  The higher expectations of those better situated are just IFF they work as 
         part of a scheme which improves the expectations of the least advantaged 
         members of society.5  
 
To see the problem Rawls had with Utilitarianism, and how DP overcomes it, consider the 
following illustrations (assume these are the only two possible distributions for this society): 
 
 
 
 
 
 
         [Fig. 1]          [Fig. 2] 
The grey bars represent the “best-off” class, and the black bars represent the “worst-off” class,  
                                                          
3 Ibid, pg. 26. 
4 Ibid, pg. 15. 
5 Ibid, pg. 75; see also pg. 83 for the Difference Principle as embedded in the 2nd Principle of Justice. 
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while the width of the bar represents population size, and the height represents level of 
expectation—roughly, the life prospects of realizing rational plans and well-being.6  In figure 1, 
the aggregate expectation is 105 units, while in figure 2 the aggregate expectation for society is 
100 units.7  Classical Utilitarianism would select the society in figure 1, because it has a 
maximized aggregate expectation.  But the problem Rawls highlights is that the distribution in 
figure 1 is such that the best-off are hugely advantaged relative to the worst-off.  Meanwhile, 
though figure 2 has a lower aggregate level of expectation, it has a much more equal distribution 
amongst the population.  Rawls’ DP would authorize selecting the distribution represented in 
figure 2, because the additional advantage conferred to the best-off in figure 1 does not improve 
the expectations of the worst-off; in fact, here, it does just the opposite.  And this is precisely the 
role DP plays in Rawls’ theory—it provides us with a principle by which to select a just 
arrangement for society by facilitating considerations not only of aggregate expectations, but also 
the distribution thereof, and helps to avoid situations like that in figure 1.  With this brief sketch 
of DP in hand, we are now situated to understand the worrisome outcome entailed by DP. 
 
3.  RELATIVE vs. ABSOLUTE EXPECTATION 
 3.1.  The Worry   
 While DP succeeds in overcoming the distribution problem afflicting classical 
Utilitarianism, it suffers from its own problem.  The problem is that by focusing on the absolute 
rather than the relative level of expectations of the worst-off, DP authorizes potentially immense 
levels of inequality, just so long as this inequality results in a higher absolute level of expectation 
                                                          
6 Ibid, see discussion of ‘Expectations’ on pg. 64, 93.  
7 Ibid, pg. 64.  The units in figures 1 and 2 are arbitrary; they are for comparison purposes only. 
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for the worst-off.8  And if this inequality between the best-off and worst-off is great enough, it 
can itself become a source of injustice.  To see how this might be so, consider the following 
illustrations. 
 
 
 
  
 
 
       [Fig. 3]    [Fig. 4]          [Fig. 5] 
 
In figure 3, there is a relatively equal distribution, but DP sanctions—indeed requires—the move 
from this distribution to the one represented in figure 4.9  Similarly, DP sanctions the move from 
figure 4’s distribution to that represented in figure 5.  For although the relative inequality 
between the best and worst-off classes increases from fig. 3 to fig. 4, and again from fig. 4 to fig. 
5, so too does the absolute level of the worst-off’s expectations increase.  And it is with this 
absolute level of expectations that DP is exclusively concerned.  This is where the worry about 
DP arises—that at some point the relative level of inequality authorized by DP will be so great as 
to itself become a source of injustice.10 
                                                          
8 A related worry is that DP “implies that any benefit, no matter how small, to the worst-off…will outweigh any loss 
to [the] better-off”; see Arrow, Kenneth (see references). 
9 To understand why DP requires this, consider the negative formulation of DP:  Inequality in expectation is unjust 
unless the worst-off would be even more worse-off without that inequality.  So, to move “backwards” from the 
situation represented in fig. 4 to fig. 3 would violate DP, because it would leave the worst-off with a lower absolute 
level of expectations about their life prospects than before. 
10 One sense of the phrase ‘at some point’ might be that there is some absolute value threshold of relative 
inequality below which DP is just and above which DP is unjust.  I would ideally like to avoid taking such a strong 
(and potentially arbitrary) position.  Rather than an absolute point, I would merely suggest that as the relative 
inequality between best-off and worst-off increases, so too does DP become increasingly unjust.  So, perhaps it is 
better understood as a sort of gradient, rather than a sort of binary (i.e., just/unjust). 
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 To further illustrate the worry, consider the following example that Lawrence Crocker 
discusses in his essay “Equality, Solidarity, and Rawls’ MaxiMin”: 
We have a close community in which there are no significant social divisions.  Income, 
wealth, and other advantages are equal to within a few percentages.  There is only one way to 
modify the society to produce a different distribution.  On the new distribution, 5 percent of 
the people would have ten times their previous incomes, and everyone else would have 1 
percent more than his or her previous income.  It would be nice for the 5 percent to have their 
incomes increased so dramatically.  The 1 percent benefit for the remaining 95 percent of the 
population seems an advantage so modest as to barely deserve consideration, but it is a slight 
plus.  On the other hand, the enormous inequality which would be introduced by this 
transition would amount to the division of society into two distinct castes.  There would be 
two castes even if the inequality of wealth did not engender an inequality of political power.11  
 
 
So, more perspicuously stated, the worry is that DP’s emphasis on the absolute level of 
expectations entails the possibility of discord, frustration, or relegation to a lower caste for the 
worst-off as a result of an immensely unequal relative level of expectations.  If that’s true, and 
the presence of this discord, frustration, lower status and the like represents a hindrance (or the 
absence of which would remove a hindrance) to the least-favored class realizing their rational life 
goals, then the DP’s formulation is a possible source of injustice.  And if that is true, then by 
focusing exclusively on absolute levels of expectations the Difference Principle fails to take 
seriously the moral significance of the relative level of expectations of the least-favored. 
 3.2.  Rawls’ Response to the Worry 
Even Rawls seems to anticipate something like the above worry, saying “A person’s 
lesser position…may be so great as to wound his self-respect”, and that “society may permit such 
large disparities in [expectations] that under existing social conditions these differences cannot 
help but cause a loss of self-esteem.”12  But he dismisses this concern, saying that “Although in 
theory the difference principle permits indefinitely large inequalities in return for small gains 
                                                          
11 Crocker (1977), pg. 265-6. 
12 Rawls (1971), pg. 534. 
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to the less favored [or worst-off], the spread of income and wealth should not be excessive in 
practice”.13 
While Rawls suggests that in practice the worry under discussion will likely never come 
to fruition, it is nevertheless unclear as to how or in what way his account can avoid this 
worrisome outcome which is, as Rawls himself notes, entailed by the Difference Principle.  One 
of Rawls’ suggestions is that the numerous groups one might belong to would make it difficult to 
even determine one’s relative disadvantage—he says “the plurality of associations in a well-
ordered society…tends to reduce the visibility, or at least the painful visibility, of variations in 
men’s prospects.”14  This is all very well, it seems, just so long as one has a sufficient number of 
associations, but not so satisfying an answer for those lacking such a “plurality of associations”. 
A second response from Rawls is that although the worry about DP is apt, it is, 
nevertheless, not any more troublesome than the entailments of other conceptions of justice.  He 
says “there seems to be no reason why the hazards of particular envy should be worse in a 
society regulated by justice as fairness than by any other conception.”15  This response is also 
less than satisfying, because while Rawls’ assertion here may be true, it nevertheless seems to 
undermine one of his primary motivations for developing his account that appears in “A Theory 
of Justice”, which was to provide an alternative account to those of Locke, Rousseau, and Kant, 
which suffer from similar problems.  So, if all of these accounts fair similarly well in this respect, 
by what reasoning would one opt for Rawls’ account, rather than the others? 
A third response from Rawls is that the citizenry in his ideal society would hold mutual 
respect and esteem in such high regard that those “more advantaged [would] not make an 
                                                          
13 Ibid, pg. 536; my emphasis 
14 Ibid, pg. 536. 
15 Ibid, pg. 537. 
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ostentatious display of their higher estate calculated to demean the condition of those who have 
less.”16  I think this response is probably the best, but it is also less than satisfying.  For while 
this may be generally true, it is easy to imagine an individual whose realization of life plans 
requires that he make an ostentatious show of his advantage.  Furthermore, those who are worse-
off may be disturbed by a non-ostentatious show—like seeing their neighbors driving expensive 
sports cars, sailing in yachts, or drinking rare imported wines, while they pedal their 10-speed 
bicycles, wear hand-me-downs, and drink soy milk. 
 
4.  SUGGESTING AN ADDENDUM TO DP 
While all of the foregoing responses seem sensible, the worry about DP still remains, for 
there is no principle or rule by which the immense relative inequalities between best-off and 
worst-off are to be forestalled.  And it is my suggestion that a principle, or rule, or some 
additional condition or addendum to DP is required to provide a robust theoretical impediment to 
DP-sanctioned distributions such that the best-off are hugely advantaged relative to the worst-off.  
Otherwise, we must do as Rawls does and rely on the weak supposition that these worrisome 
theoretical entailments of DP will fail to manifest in practice. 
My humble suggestion is that because the problem seems to arise when moving from one 
DP-sanctioned distribution to another that has a higher absolute level of expectation for worst-
off, but a lower relative expectation, the solution is to put a cap on the amount of relative 
inequality that is allowed when moving from an initial distribution to a second.  One very simple 
way to do this is would be to stipulate that the relative level of expectation of those worst-off in a 
                                                          
16 Ibid, pg. 537. 
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second distribution is not to exceed the level that existed in the initial distribution.  To illustrate 
this point, consider the following simplified examples: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   D1       D2 
 
So, the initial distribution, D1, has a relative level of expectation of 5:3.  On my suggested 
addendum, to move from D1 to D2 requires that the relative expectation of 5:3 not be exceeded.  
So for example, to move the best-off from 50 to 100 units is justified only if the expectations of 
the worst-off increase to 60 units (or greater) in D2.   
 More precisely formulated, the addendum would look like this:17  
 
Addendum:  B* – B   
           W*– W 
 
 Where:  B* = the absolute level of expectations for best-off in the 2nd distribution. 
    B = the absolute level of expectations for best-off in the initial distribution. 
    W* = the absolute level of expectations for worst-off in the 2nd distribution. 
    W = the absolute level of expectations for worst-off in the initial distribution. 
    B/W = the relative expectations of the best-off over the worst-off. 
 
 
In this way, the addendum (i) allows for inequality, (ii) this inequality is still subject to DP (i.e., 
                                                          
17 Credit is due to Crocker (see References) for inspiring me to formulate my addendum to DP in mathematical 
terms. 
50 
30 
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benefits the worst-off), but it also (iii) precludes the sort of increases in relative expectation that 
were illustrated in fig. 3-5.  It is important to keep in mind that this addendum is merely a 
humble suggestion; I realize that there will doubtless be concerns stemming from the addendum, 
but it is an initial, prima facie plausible suggestion for trying to forestall the sort of immense 
relative inequalities that even Rawls himself acknowledges are entailed by the Difference 
Principle. 
 
5.  CONCLUSION 
John Rawls’ book “A Theory of Justice” represents an immense contribution to the field 
of political philosophy, in no small part because of his two principles of justice expressed 
therein.  And while his second principle of justice relies on the intuitively appealing 
understanding of just inequality encapsulated in the Difference Principle, there is nevertheless a 
worrisome entailment of this principle—that even extraordinary levels of inequality are 
considered just, so long as this inequality redounds to the benefit of the worst-off class of 
society.  I have suggested that the potentially immense level of inequality can itself become a 
source of injustice by hindering the realization of individual’s rational life plans and well-being. 
And that if that is so, then the difference principle requires the inclusion of some formal 
provision to safeguard against such inequalities.  I then suggested that the prima facie plausible 
addendum to the Difference Principle I offer could provide such a safeguard, and would thereby 
ensure that Rawls’ two principles do not ultimately justify what would amount to immense, 
socially divisive inequalities. 
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